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ABSTRACT—Since passage of the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925, arbitral
proceedings have played an important role in American dispute resolution
processes. However, the frequent application of the FAA to employment
contexts is a relatively new phenomenon. Over the past thirty years, the
Supreme Court has heralded an explosion in the use of mandatory arbitration
agreements in employee contracts, reshaping employment law and limiting
workers’ access to courts. Vast swaths of American workers are now bound
to agreements they know little about that provide them only precarious
protections. Justifiable backlashes to this terraforming of the employment
law landscape have begun to sprout up in various workplaces.
This Essay suggests that the uninhibited expansion of arbitration to
employment contexts has been a net negative for American workers. While
current arbitration procedures are suitable for the commercial business-tobusiness disputes the FAA originally envisioned, these procedures have not
been appropriately modified for workplace contexts, making such cases ripe
for abuse. Documenting the history of the FAA and modern Court decisions
regarding it, this Essay contends that Congress will need to act boldly in
order to develop a system of arbitration suitable for workers.
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INTRODUCTION
Twenty thousand Google employees staged a walkout in 2018,
protesting the use of mandatory arbitration for sexual misconduct claims.1
Responding quickly, Google and Facebook then ended their use of
mandatory arbitration for sex discrimination cases.2 Two years later, Google
extended that policy shift to include a ban on the use of arbitration for
harassment, discrimination, and retaliation-related disputes. 3 Elsewhere,
major law firms have begun caving to pressure from law school lecturers to
withdraw similar forced arbitration agreements.4 Opposition to arbitration is
on the rise.
Pushback on arbitration likely stems in part from the dramatic increase
in the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts over the
past decades. In the early 1990s, few nonunion workplaces included
arbitration agreements in their employment contracts.5 Now, more than half

1
Jena McGregor, Google and Facebook Ended Forced Arbitration for Sexual Harassment Claims.
Why More Companies Could Follow, WASH. POST: ON LEADERSHIP (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/business/2018/11/12/google-facebook-ended-forced-arbitration-sex-harassmentclaims-why-more-companies-could-follow/ [https://perma.cc/5WCR-B8DS].
2
Id. (“Last week, two of Silicon Valley’s biggest tech heavyweights said they were ending their
policy of forcing workers to settle sexual harassment claims through private arbitration, allowing
employees to pursue those claims in court. Google’s announcement came Thursday . . . and Facebook’s
came just a day later.”).
3
Alaina Lancaster, Google Ends Mandatory Arbitration in $310M Sexual Harassment Settlement,
LAW.COM (Sept. 25, 2020, 1:50 PM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2020/09/25/google-endsmandatory-arbitration-in-310m-sexual-harassment-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/QJ2U-6JZA].
4
Angela Morris, Why 3 BigLaw Firms Ended Use of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, A.B.A. J. (June
1, 2018, 12:15 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/biglaw_mandatory_arbitration_
clauses [https://perma.cc/D6RH-24L7].
5
Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Metastasization of Mandatory Arbitration, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 7
(2019) (discussing academic studies in the early 1990s that showed significantly lower rates of arbitration
clause use in nonunion workplaces).

2

117:1 (2022)

Arbitration in the Workplace: The Need for Legislative Intervention

of all nonunion workplaces require mandatory arbitration for employees.6 As
these agreements are forced upon newly hired employees without
negotiation, workers often do not understand their effect, discovering that
they are no longer entitled to sue their employers only after litigation is
pursued. 7 Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has intervened
comprehensively to halt coercive or abusive uses of arbitration,8 so perhaps
pushback is unsurprising. In any case, arbitration reform is overdue.
This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly explores the history of
American arbitration and explains the nature of arbitral proceedings, which
began as an efficient conflict-resolution mechanism between businesses. Part
II analyzes the development of arbitration in commercial and employment
contexts and details the uniquely harmful effects of mandatory arbitration
when wielded against employees. Part III then considers the Supreme
Court’s recent employment-related arbitration decisions and argues that
those decisions show that the Court will not protect workers from the harm
arbitration causes employees. Finally, Part IV explores ways in which
arbitration can be improved through legislative reforms. This Essay
ultimately argues that a fair and equitable system of arbitration for
employment disputes can be achieved through a series of both legislative and
professional reforms, such as removing class action waivers and requiring
new ethical guidelines for arbitrators.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF ARBITRATION

The evolution of the law of arbitration informs its impact. Prior to the
1920s, courts frequently refused to enforce arbitration agreements.9 In order
“to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements,”10

6
Id. at 9 (showing that survey results from a study exploring nonunion arbitration clause use found
“50.4 percent of responding [nonunion] establishments” required arbitration as the exclusive dispute
resolution method).
7
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Consent, Coercion, and Employment Law, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
409, 432 (2020) (explaining that arbitration clauses ordinarily “have been offered as a take-it-or-leave-it
condition of employment. Individual workers lack the power to resist the imposition of terms like these.
Indeed, they are unlikely to read the fine print of arbitration contracts—or even necessarily know that
they have agreed to them—in any event” (footnotes omitted)). For a discussion of the functional
differences between arbitration and litigation, see infra Part II.
8
See infra Part III.
9
Deepak Gupta & Lina M. Khan, Arbitration as Wealth Transfer, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 499,
504 (2017) (noting that “[u]ntil the 1920s federal courts refused to enforce arbitration agreements”).
10
Thomas J. Lilly, Jr., The Use of Arbitration Agreements to Defeat Federal Statutory Rights: What
Remains of the Effective Vindication Doctrine After American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant?,
61 WAYNE L. REV. 301, 305 (2016) (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24
(1991)) (providing context for Congress’s passage of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925).

3

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

Congress unanimously passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925.11
The FAA of 1925 broke with judicial antipathy to arbitration, requiring
federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements in commercial contexts.12
Leaders and activists—concerned that “the powerful people . . . [would]
come in and take away the rights of the weaker ones”—were assured that
arbitral proceedings would be confined to disputes between consenting
merchants of roughly equal bargaining power.13 Eventually, however, those
assurances became emptier and emptier.14
Starting in the 1980s, the Supreme Court issued a series of increasingly
sweeping proarbitration decisions. In 1983, the Supreme Court interpreted
the FAA expansively when it held that the FAA created a “federal policy
favoring arbitration” and that the Act established that “any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration . . . .”15 In 1984, the Court delved into state law interactions with
the FAA, holding that state laws limiting arbitration violated the Supremacy
Clause.16 In 1985, the Court held that arbitrators could also apply statutory
laws, such as the Sherman Antitrust Act.17 Soon after, the Court permitted

11
Gupta & Khan, supra note 9, at 505 (describing the intense lobbying Congress faced from various
proarbitration business interests desperate for court arbitration enforcement); see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14
(1925).
12
Id. at § 2 (“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.”).
13
Gupta & Khan, supra note 9, at 505 (quoting Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How
the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 99, 106–07 (2006)).
14
See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between
Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575,
624 (1992) (“One result of industrial pluralist rhetoric is that the Supreme Court has elevated private
arbitration to an exalted status within labor law doctrine. In a series of benchmark decisions in the late
1950s and early 1960s, the Supreme Court adopted the pluralist rationale of defending the minidemocracy from external, particularly judicial, intervention.” (footnote omitted)).
15
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983) (finding that
questions of arbitrability require courts to favor arbitration regardless as to “whether the problem at hand
is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability”).
16
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1984) (“In creating a substantive rule applicable
in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the
enforceability of arbitration agreements. We hold that § 31512 of the California Franchise Investment
Law violates the Supremacy Clause.” (footnotes omitted)).
17
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638–40 (1985)
(“Accordingly, we ‘require this representative of the American business community to honor its
bargain,’ . . . by holding this agreement to arbitrate ‘enforce[able] . . . in accord with the explicit
provisions of the Arbitration Act.’” (alteration in original and citation omitted)).
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arbitration in routine consumer contracts18 and in employment agreements
where statutory language arguably conflicted with the use of arbitration.19 In
the landmark AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion decision, the Court held
that arbitration clauses can also be used to deny access to class action
lawsuits. 20 The 2018 Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis decision extended that
precedent to employment contexts.21 Despite recent language from the Court
de-emphasizing a judicial preference for arbitration, 22 the aforementioned
precedent governs employment arbitration contracts.
Because parties may draft highly unique arbitration agreements, arbitral
proceedings lack much standardization beyond the existence of arbitrators
and the lack of court involvement.23 Arbitration agreements may vary as to:
who chooses arbitrators, how many arbitrators are chosen, whether parties
may join to form classes, what matters must be arbitrated, how expansive
discovery may be, and whether the arbitrators are competent to determine
their own competence.24 In aggregate, the lack of FAA requirements creates
a highly flexible, often faster, and frequently cheaper alternative to the court

18
See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (“What States may not do
is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair
enough to enforce its arbitration clause.”).
19
See Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 129 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Today,
however, the Court fulfills the original—and originally unfounded—fears of organized labor by
essentially rewriting the text of § 1 to exclude the employment contracts solely of ‘seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of [transportation] workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.’ . . .
[I]t is clear that it was not intended to apply to employment contracts at all.” (alteration in original)). But
see id. at 119 (“Section 1 exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation
workers.”).
20
563 U.S. 333, 351–52 (2011) (holding that “California’s Discover Bank rule is pre-empted by the
FAA” and that arbitration agreements can be used to prevent class formation).
21
138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018) (“The respective merits of class actions and private arbitration as
means of enforcing the law are questions constitutionally entrusted not to the courts to decide but to the
policymakers in the political branches where those questions remain hotly contested . . . . The policy may
be debatable but the law is clear: Congress has instructed that arbitration agreements like those before us
must be enforced as written.”).
22
Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., No. 21-328, 2022 WL 1611788, at *4 (U.S. May 23, 2022) (“But the
FAA’s ‘policy favoring arbitration’ does not authorize federal courts to invent special, arbitrationpreferring procedural rules”).
23
Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards Justice in Employment Law:
Where to, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 173–74 (2019).
24
See Gene Commander, SCOTUS Decision Applies FAA to Empower Businesses and Arbitrators,
48 COLO. LAW. 30, 32 (2019) (“Schein confirms that businesses can agree in advance to delegate
authority to an arbitrator . . . including the authority to decide threshold arbitrability issues.”); see also
Andrew Myburgh & Jordi Paniagua, Does International Commercial Arbitration Promote Foreign Direct
Investment?, 59 J.L. & ECON. 597, 600 (2016) (discussing how commercial arbitration allows parties to
“determine the number of arbitrators on the tribunal, the procedure for selecting arbitrators, the place of
arbitration, the applicable law, and the tribunal’s powers”).
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system.25 However, due to shifting court precedent, which has progressively
expanded the reach of arbitration, the lack of FAA requirements for arbitral
proceedings also creates a system that is potentially ripe for abuse.26
II.

ARBITRATION’S IMPACT

Although the FAA originally envisioned arbitration as a forum for
commercial entities with broadly equal bargaining power, currently more
than half of nonunion private sector workers are bound by mandatory
arbitration agreements.27 Many of those agreements have sprung up in the
last five years. 28 However, while arbitration carries many benefits in
commercial contexts,29 its benefits do not neatly extend to the employment
contexts in which arbitration has become increasingly common.30 Despite the
widespread use of arbitration agreements, individuals bound by them often
do not know they are bound or wrongly believe that forced-arbitration
clauses nevertheless allow them to take companies to court. 31 This Part
begins by exploring the application of arbitration to commercial contexts—
showing that arbitration is well suited for domestic and foreign disputes
between commercial entities—before detailing how arbitration’s use in the
employment context is ripe for abuse and fails to protect American workers.
A. Commercial Contexts
Congress first envisioned arbitration as a tool for disputes between
businesses, 32 and in that context, well-drafted arbitration clauses provide
entities with confidentiality, flexibility, efficiency, and predictability.33 By
arbitrating rather than litigating disputes, large commercial entities assist in
25
See Myburgh & Paniagua, supra note 24, at 600 (explaining the efficiency-related benefits to be
found in commercial arbitration, including the ability to select arbitral proceedings and applicable law);
Commander, supra note 24, at 33–34.
26
See infra Section II.B.
27
Colvin, supra note 5, at 9.
28
See id. at 10 (“For employers who have adopted mandatory arbitration, I asked them how recently
they adopted this policy. Among the employers with mandatory employment arbitration, 39.5% of them
adopted their policy within the last five years, i.e. from 2012 to [2017] . . . .”).
29
Myburgh & Paniagua, supra note 24, at 600–01.
30
See infra Section II.B.
31
See Gupta & Khan, supra note 9, at 500 n.6 (“In a 2014 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) survey of credit-card holders, for example, half of all respondents said they did not know whether
they had the right to sue their credit card issuer in court, and more than one-third of those who were bound
by forced-arbitration clauses still believed, incorrectly, that they could take the company to court.”) (citing
Arbitration Study: Report to Congress Pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act § 1028(a), CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU § 3, at 19 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance
.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitrarion-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/32Q2-86SJ].
32
Id. at 505.
33
Myburgh & Paniagua, supra note 24, at 600–01.
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declogging the congested American court system. 34 In exchange, large
commercial entities gain the ability to structure dispute resolution procedures
as they desire.35 Because entities in commercial transactions tend to have
relatively equal bargaining power, the parties often fashion mutually
beneficial arbitration clauses.36
Commercial entities also prefer arbitration for purposes of
confidentiality. While the FAA does not ensure confidentiality in arbitral
proceedings, parties usually include confidentiality as a standard express
provision, and some states mandate confidentiality. 37 In international
commercial arbitration, an implied duty of confidentiality binds parties.38
Arbitration also provides flexibility to contracting parties. For example,
some commercial entities may prefer to have dispute resolution overseen by
individuals with unique arbitral expertise. 39 Moreover, arbitration grants
commercial entities the option to choose to use industry experts as
arbitrators.40 By moving more quickly than standard litigation, arbitration
also increases overall efficiency.41 Further, through choice of law provisions
and forum selection clauses,42 arbitration allows businesses to plan for future
proceedings and thus provides businesses with predictability.43
34

See Commander, supra note 24, at 33–34.
See Jane Flanagan & Terri Gerstein, “Sign on the Dotted Line”: How Coercive Employment
Contracts Are Bringing Back the Lochner Era and What We Can Do About It, 54 U.S.F. L. REV. 441,
451 (2020) (describing arbitration provisions used by employers to “stack the deck” in favor of the
employer); see also Myburgh & Paniagua, supra note 24, at 600 (describing the flexibility of commercial
arbitration).
36
Flanagan & Gerstein, supra note 35, at 451.
37
Christopher M. Campbell, U.S.A. vs. the World: Right to Public Access of Court Records and
Confidentiality Concerns in Commercial Arbitration, 15 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 99, 119–20 (2018); see
Laura A. Kaster, Confidentiality in U.S. Arbitration, 5 N.Y. DISP. RESOL. LAW. 23 (2012).
38
Avinash Poorooye & Ronán Feehily, Confidentiality and Transparency in International
Commercial Arbitration: Finding the Right Balance, 22 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 275, 286 (2017).
39
Myburgh & Paniagua, supra note 24, at 600 (discussing how commercial arbitration allows parties
to “determine the number of arbitrators on the tribunal, the procedure for selecting arbitrators, the place
of arbitration, the applicable law, and the tribunal’s powers”).
40
Id. (“There are likely to be substantial benefits from being able to use specialized adjudicators as
opposed to relying on generalist domestic courts.”).
41
See generally ROY WEINSTEIN, CULLEN EDES, JOE HALE & NELS PEARSALL, MICRONOMICS
ECON. RSCH. & CONSULTING, EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
THROUGH ARBITRATION COMPARED WITH U.S. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS (2017), https://static1.
squarespace.com/static/61b53e492ea58d13b806ccb3/t/61bb8320fa9ba06e1700a3bc/1639678753466/Ef
ficiency_Economic_Benefits_Dispute_Resolution_through_Arbitration_Compared_with_US_District_
Court_Proceedings.pdf [https://perma.cc/XPR9-3GRY] (providing a comparison of arbitration and
federal courts for dispute resolution purposes and finding that district courts takes roughly a year longer
than the AAA to resolve disputes).
42
Myburgh & Paniagua, supra note 24, at 600.
43
While businesses may expect to face litigation in obvious forum states, arbitration clauses can
more easily limit the applied law and the sites of arbitral proceedings. See id.
35
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Internationally, the high frequency of commercial arbitration has led to
the development of arbitral norms, increasing business predictability in one
of the key areas where arbitration can be unpredictable: the form and
structure of the proceeding.44 Arbitration proceedings traditionally apply the
English system, where losing parties pay attorneys’ fees. 45 Accordingly,
nuisance suits are less common when arbitration is mandated, reducing
unnecessary expenditures.46 International arbitration in commercial contexts
may even benefit forum countries, especially those that take care to enforce
arbitration clauses. One study found that strengthening arbitration regimes
may result in increased foreign direct investment: countries which provided
greater assurances that arbitration awards would be enforced experienced
more extensive foreign direct investment than countries with weaker
arbitration regimes.47 Thus, arbitration may not only reduce foreign courts’
congestion but also increase prosperity abroad.
Significantly, businesses and their attorneys seem to prefer arbitration.
In a study investigating corporate counsel’s perceptions of arbitration in
business-to-business disputes, 52% of respondents found arbitration to be
better than traditional litigation for resolving disputes, and almost 60% of
respondents believed that arbitration saved time. 48 Additionally, most
respondents believed that arbitration reduced costs relative to litigation. 49
However, over 70% of respondents also thought that arbitration frequently
“split the baby,” dealing out less satisfactory rewards to winners but also less
damaging results to losers.50 While a lower reward may not be ideal for a
commercial entity that is on the winning side of a dispute, businesses seeking
to reduce risk would greatly benefit from the smaller rewards provided by
arbitration. In fact, 75% of respondents indicated that the alternative risk of

44
See Tony Cole, Pietro Ortolani & Barbara Warwas, Arbitration in Southern Europe: Insights from
a Large-Scale Empirical Study, 26 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 187, 267 (2015) (concluding that there are
standardized norms of arbitral practice developing at an elite level of transnational arbitral practice).
45
Myburgh & Paniagua, supra note 24, at 601.
46
See id. (explaining the increased likelihood of nuisance suits in courts using the American system
due to the decreased cost burden on the losing party).
47
Id. at 622.
48
DOUGLAS SHONTZ, FRED KIPPERMAN & VANESSA SOMA, RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST., BUSINESSTO-BUSINESS ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: PERCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE COUNSEL 8–9 (2011),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR781.html [https://perma.cc/Y89G-3X77] (showing that
17% and 35% of respondents believed that arbitration was better or somewhat better than litigation for
resolving business-to-business disputes).
49
Id. at 9.
50
Id. at 11 (“When asked whether they agreed or disagreed that arbitrators tend to ‘split the baby’—
i.e., are less likely than a judge or jury to decide strongly in favor of one side or the other—over 70 percent
of respondents agreed, and only 14 percent disagreed . . . .”).
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excessive and emotionally driven jury awards encouraged the use of
arbitration in commercial contracts.51
When employed in commercial disputes, arbitration provides lasting
benefits to commercial entities. Those benefits include flexibility,
predictability, and arbitral expertise when desired. Because commercial
entities in business-to-business transactions are usually of relatively equal
bargaining power, arbitration in commercial contexts matches with its
original legislative intent: it reduces caseloads in the courts without stealing
away the “rights of the weaker ones.”52
B. The Uniqueness of Employment Contexts: Bargaining Power
In contrast to business-to-business agreements, arbitration agreements
between employers and employees tend to benefit employers at the expense
of workers. 53 Nevertheless, dramatic growth in workplace arbitration
continues. In 1992, mandatory arbitration clauses bound only 2% of
nonunionized private sector employees. 54 By 2018, that percentage had
jumped to over 56%.55 The frequency of arbitration clauses in employment
contracts is expected to continue to grow unabated, with arbitration clauses
projected to govern more than 80% of nonunionized private sector
employees by 2024.56
In theory, arbitration could provide workers with many of the benefits
it provides large entities in commercial contexts: namely, flexibility,
efficiency, predictability, and confidentiality when desired. Court cases
expanding the use of arbitration in employment contexts have highlighted
these potential benefits. 57 In practice, however, arbitration in its current
incarnation does not offer workers the benefits it provides commercial
entities in business-to-business transactions. Arbitration instead uses the
unequal bargaining power of workers against them, and lack of awareness
51
Id. at 15 (“For 75 percent of respondents, the risk of excessive or emotionally driven jury awards
encourages including arbitration clauses in B2B [business-to-business] contracts . . . . Only 7 percent of
respondents disagreed, and only 15 percent had neutral opinions.”).
52
Gupta & Khan, supra note 9, at 505 (quoting Moses, supra note 13, at 106–07).
53
See Flanagan & Gerstein, supra note 35, at 451 ("[S]ome arbitration provisions are explicitly
structured to dissuade claims or ‘stack the deck’ in favor of the employer.”).
54
Id. at 447.
55
Id. The massive shift in arbitration utilization rates likely results from both a general business
consensus that arbitration saves businesses money and new, expansive proarbitration court precedent,
which is discussed at length in Part III.
56
Id.
57
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344–45 (2011) (“The point of affording
parties discretion in designing arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures
tailored to the type of dispute . . . . And the informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing
the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution.”).
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surrounding the contents of arbitration clauses means that many employees
will not understand the agreements that bind them.58
Unlike in commercial contexts, arbitration agreements that bind
employees are not usually negotiated. While courts have at times classified
arbitration agreements as a freely chosen bargain between workers and their
employers,59 an employee usually has no real choice because their employer
sets the terms of the agreement.60 These terms include the ability to select
potentially biased arbitrators 61 and to limit discovery in ways that would
make finding employer liability more difficult.62 Further, employees—who
are already at a bargaining disadvantage relative to employers—typically
sign their arbitration agreements as part of the onboarding process provided
to new hires.63 Newly hired employees may be especially unlikely to resist
coercive contracts.64
Once bound to an arbitration agreement, employees “almost never file
arbitration claims.”65 In one estimate, somewhere between 9,600 and 28,400
fewer federal employment arbitration claims were filed in 2016 than would
have been expected, given the rate of federal employment litigation claims
that year.66 Although more than half of all nonunion private sector employees
are subject to arbitration clauses, only about 5,100 employment arbitration

58
Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 432 (explaining that arbitration clauses in employment contracts are
rarely understood by bound individuals and that workers lack any real ability to refuse signing them
regardless); Colvin, supra note 5, at 8 n.27 (“The study found that a majority of Circuit City employees
he interviewed were unaware that they had signed arbitration agreements or of the import of such
agreements . . . .”).
59
See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018) (“Should employees and employers
be allowed to agree that any disputes between them will be resolved through one-on-one arbitration? Or
should employees always be permitted to bring their claims in class or collective actions, no matter what
they agreed with their employers?”).
60
Sternlight, supra note 23, at 171.
61
See Miles B. Farmer, Mandatory and Fair? A Better System of Mandatory Arbitration, 121 YALE
L.J. 2346, 2385 (2012) (discussing how changes to arbitration could reduce arbitrator bias).
62
See Sternlight, supra note 23, at 174 n.127 (explaining that arbitration provides the drafting party
with immense flexibility, such as the ability to “disallow particular types of discovery and particular kinds
of motions”).
63
Colvin, supra note 5, at 8–9.
64
See Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 432 (arguing that because arbitration agreements act as “take-itor-leave-it condition[s] of employment,” workers are unable to “resist the imposition” of their terms).
65
Gupta & Khan, supra note 9, at 512 (quoting Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How
American Employers Are Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80
BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1312 (2015)).
66
Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679, 692 (2018)
(discussing “an estimate of between 9600 and 28,400 ‘missing’ arbitrations”). Although it is unclear why
employees are dropping so many claims under arbitration, it may be the case that the opaque nature of
arbitral proceedings combined with a sense that success is less likely disincentivizes employees from
pursuing their rights.
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claims were filed in 2016, even as 31,000 federal employment lawsuits were
filed by nonunion private sector employees without arbitration agreements.67
The number of missing arbitration claims grows when accounting for
missing state and collective action claims.68
Even for the employment arbitration claims that are filed, the win rate
and award amounts for employees are lower than in employment litigation.69
A 2011 study found that the win rate for employees in arbitral proceedings
was roughly fifteen percentage points lower than the win rate of employment
discrimination cases in federal courts and approximately thirty-five
percentage points lower than the win rate of employees in state courts. 70
While the study noted that the reduced win rate could have resulted from
differences in the types of claims, it also found that the median arbitration
award for successful cases was over $100,000 lower than in federal court.71
Perhaps some of these differences result from the fact that arbitrators
deciding employment disputes shy away from punitive damage rewards and
rarely grant interest on back pay, even when their decisions are issued years
after an unjust dismissal.72 But the fact remains that employees win fewer
cases under arbitration regimes and receive smaller awards when they do.
Employees’ diminished outcomes may result in part from repeat player
bias, which can occur when one party uses a dispute resolution system
repeatedly and the other party does not.73 In arbitration, this bias results from
a natural dichotomy between employers and employees: unlike in arbitration
between opposing commercial entities, which involves multiple repeat
players thus eliminating or reducing consistent bias towards one side or the
other, employees are significantly less likely than employers to enlist an
arbitrator’s services more than once.74 Studies have raised concerns about
67

Id. at 691.
See id. at 693–94 (Professor Mark Gough has found that an “estimate of 195,000 state cases is
likely to yield a more realistic estimate of total employment lawsuits, and a more realistic estimate of
‘missing’ arbitration cases.”).
69
Gupta & Khan, supra note 9, at 512.
70
Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and
Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (2011).
71
Id. (finding that whereas the median employment arbitration award is approximately $36,500,
successful employment discrimination cases in federal court yielded median awards of approximately
$150,500).
72
Stone, supra note 14, at 629–30 (“[R]emedies in arbitration are not as effective or as generous as
remedies in a judicial forum. For example, most arbitrators believe that they do not have the power to
award damages for intangible harms, or to award punitive or consequential damages. In addition,
arbitrators almost never grant interest on back pay awards, even when they are issued months or years
after an unjust dismissal. It is common practice for an arbitrator to award reinstatement but no back pay
at all to a worker fired without just cause.” (footnotes omitted)).
73
Colvin, supra note 5, at 22.
74
Id.
68
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biased arbitrators since the 1990s. 75 Moreover, anecdotes from arbitral
proceedings indicate that impropriety in arbitrator–employer relationships
may be common and potentially far in excess of what ethics guidelines would
allow for similarly positioned judges. For example, arbitrators have been
known to attend sporting events and casual lunches with employers’ in-house
counsel in the midst of ongoing arbitral proceedings.76 Given that empirical
studies have found significant variances in arbitral outcomes depending on
whether the employer had previously enlisted an arbitrator’s services,77 such
improper relationships may disadvantage employees pursuing arbitration.
In addition to facing potential bias from arbitrators, employees are
likely disadvantaged by reduced access to effective representation. Whereas
employer-side attorneys may gain a consistent client by defending an
employer in an arbitral proceeding, an employee-side attorney’s client
relationship likely ends after a one-off engagement.78 Additionally, because
mandatory arbitration reduces the likelihood of an employee’s success,
results in reduced damages, and eliminates class actions, employee-side
attorneys may be unwilling to take on employee arbitration claims.79 Pro se
representation, with only a 7% success rate in arbitration, is not a viable
alternative either, even with the relaxed discovery procedures available in
arbitration.80 Thus, employees are simply not well positioned to enjoy the
benefits of mandatory arbitration.
C. The Uniqueness of Employment Contexts: Employment Discrimination
Looking only to the success of individual employee claims and
bargaining power differences, however, may underestimate arbitration’s
damage to employees. Diverting so much of employment law to binding,
75

Colvin, supra note 70, at 11.
Estlund, supra note 66, at 686 (“Among the ‘subtler’ forms of partiality was ‘the case of the
arbitrator who went to a basketball game with the company’s lawyers the night before the proceedings
began. (The company won.)’ In another case, ‘a dismayed [plaintiff] watched the arbitrator and defense
lawyer return in matching silver sports cars after going to lunch together. (He lost.)’” (alteration in
original and footnotes omitted) (quoting Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a
‘Privatization of the Justice System,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015))), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html [https://perma.cc
/979P-K9BD])).
77
See Colvin, supra note 70, at 13 (“Despite the conservative nature of the test, there is strong
evidence of a repeat employer effect, with employees winning 31.6 percent of cases involving one-shot
employers, whereas they won only 16.9 percent of cases involving repeat employers, which was a
statistically significant difference (p < 0.01).”).
78
See Sternlight, supra note 23, at 179 (discussing how “mandatory arbitration also suppresses
claims by making it even harder for employees to retain attorneys than it otherwise would be”).
79
Id.
80
Id. at 179–80. Theoretically, pro se plaintiffs can benefit from the less formalistic discovery
procedures of arbitration. Id.
76

12

117:1 (2022)

Arbitration in the Workplace: The Need for Legislative Intervention

confidential arbitration puts workers at risk of being left out of legal
advances that would otherwise protect the most vulnerable. Further, recent
cases have revealed serious issues with applications of arbitration in
employment discrimination contexts.
Arbitration seems to reduce employment discrimination cases both
directly and indirectly. Despite national population growth, employment
discrimination cases declined by more than 25% between 1998 and 2012.81
The rise of arbitration clauses in employment contracts may thus be rerouting
such claims to confidential arbitral tribunals that do not expand the law
through precedent, thereby stymieing progress.82 Vulnerable employees may
have claims that exist in a legal gray area83—claims that are best resolved by
the disclosed decision-making of the appellate system.84 Arbitration, which
at times lacks written-out reasoning in its decisions,85 fails to sufficiently
replace this mechanism.
Due to its confidential and individualized nature, arbitration also fails
to provide crucial notice to wronged employees that similar suits are being
pursued. Arbitral proceedings are traditionally confidential,86 and arbitration
agreements are often paired with expansive and sometimes illegal
nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) that prohibit disclosures related to one’s
employment.87 Additionally, due to the Supreme Court’s Epic Systems Corp.
v. Lewis holding that class action waivers in employment contracts are not
81
Colvin, supra note 5, at 21 (“It is only when we get to the later 2000s and 2010s when the growth
of mandatory arbitration had expanded further do we start getting to the point where a sufficient
proportion of employees were covered by the practice to potentially make a dent in litigation rates.
Interestingly, employment discrimination litigation rates levelled off and declined during this period,
despite the overall growth in the population. In 2012, only 16,789 employment discrimination lawsuits
were filed in the federal court, a decline of over 6,000 from the 1998 total.”).
82
See Sternlight, supra note 23, at 191–92 (explaining how the rise of arbitration removes cases on
the penumbra of legal issues, preventing precedent from developing at the rate it would otherwise likely
develop).
83
See id. at 184 (“Imagine that an employee goes to an attorney because she believes she has been
discriminated against on the basis of a status that is not explicitly addressed under federal or state law.”).
84
See id. at 192 (“An appellate court may be asked to review the jury’s verdict or the jury
instructions. Through these kinds of decisions, judges spell out the meaning of our employment law, and
these kinds of decisions will disappear to the extent employment disputes are sent to arbitration.”
(footnotes omitted)).
85
But see id. at 182 (“Still, some scholars have challenged the idea that arbitration is inherently
‘lawless.’ As Christopher Drahozal notes, few have taken the time to try to explain what this supposed
lawlessness really means . . . . Is arbitration lawless because arbitration decisions do not contain legal
reasoning, or because those decisions are not appealed or published? It is important to remember that
arbitration varies substantially from context to context.” (footnote omitted)).
86
Poorooye & Feehily, supra note 38, at 277–78.
87
Flanagan & Gerstein, supra note 35, at 453–54 (explaining that such broadly written NDAs hurt
employees’ chances of speaking up for themselves as well as their exit options, as the NDA can also
“prohibit one employee from recommending a former co-worker”).
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per se invalid, arbitration clauses now often prevent class action lawsuits on
the part of employees.88
In the #MeToo era, this combination of traits has shown mandatory
arbitration to be exceptionally ill suited to dealing with certain forms of
widespread employment discrimination. 89 By denying notice to wronged
employees that other employees were pursuing similar claims, mandatory
arbitration has uniquely harmed employee victims of sexual harassment and
made clear that mandatory arbitration is an ineffective forum for
employment discrimination cases. In 2016, for example, former Fox News
anchor Gretchen Carlson successfully sued former Fox News CEO Roger
Ailes for sexual harassment.90 Unusually, she did not sue the party with the
biggest pockets, Fox News. 91 Carlson was constrained to targeting Ailes
because suing Fox News would have led to enforcement of a mandatory
arbitration agreement, thus preventing Carlson’s suit and silencing the
allegations. 92 Carlson’s unique tactic worked: she received a significant
settlement, and the suit’s publicity led over twenty other women to come
forward with claims and witness statements, corroborating Ailes’s
harassment over many years.93 Those stories had previously been suppressed
by NDAs and mandatory confidential arbitration. 94 Had mandatory
arbitration not been required of Fox News employees, Ailes’s years of abuse
might have been uncovered much earlier due to the public nature of
lawsuits.95

88

See 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018) (“[I]t’s altogether unclear . . . . why we should read the NLRA
as mandating the availability of class or collective actions when the FLSA expressly authorizes them yet
allows parties to contract for bilateral arbitration instead.”).
89
Sternlight, supra note 23, at 201.
90
Id. at 201–02.
91
Id. at 202.
92
Id.
93
Emily Crockett, Here Are the Women Who Have Publicly Accused Roger Ailes of Sexual
Harassment, VOX (Aug. 15, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2016/8/15/12416662/roger-ailes-foxsexual-harassment-women-list [https://perma.cc/7LPM-MG47] (detailing how Roger Ailes’s resignation
in July 2016 preceded a flood of “at least 20 other women” contacting Gretchen Carlson’s attorneys to
report a pattern of abuse obscured by Fox News arbitration agreements).
94
See Hope Reese, Gretchen Carlson on How Forced Arbitration Allows Companies to Protect
Harassers, VOX (May 21, 2018, 11:44 AM), https://www.vox.com/conversations/2018/4/30/17292482/
gretchen-carlson-me-too-sexual-harassment-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/R6UG-BKC3] (“Let’s say
you’re being harassed. You go to complain to HR. The company wipes their forehead with their hand and
goes, ‘Phew, nobody will ever know about this,’ because of these clauses. Then you get thrown into
forced arbitration . . . .”).
95
See id. Carlson’s experience has led her to fight against mandatory arbitration in employment
contracts. Id. (“Now Carlson is focusing her efforts on ending forced arbitration, which she signed in her
own contract with Fox News, and helping women speak publicly about harassment.”).
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In sum, unnegotiated, mandatory arbitration provides employees with
fewer protections and worse outcomes while depriving our legal system of
new precedent. Moreover, employees face bargaining power deficits during
the agreement phase, as well as potentially biased proceedings and outcomes.
Mandatory arbitration might also lead employers to continue harboring bad
actors for years without recourse. Unlike in commercial contexts, where
mandatory arbitration still serves the useful purpose that Congress
envisioned in 1925,96 mandatory arbitration in employment contexts needs
reforms in order to safeguard workers.
III.

THE COURT’S TREATMENT OF ARBITRATION

Given that much of arbitration law derives from shifting court
precedent,97 courts may initially appear to be a viable route for reenvisioning
employment applications of the FAA. The recent Morgan v. Sundance
precedent, limiting access to arbitration after a party has commenced
litigation in federal courts, lends credence to this position. 98 However,
examined in its totality, the Court has taken a decidedly antiworker course
when applying the FAA to employment contexts; thus, courts will likely not
be a forum where employees can expect to receive protection from
mandatory arbitration. This Part shows how the Court’s decisions vis-à-vis
the FAA have progressively worsened applications of the FAA to
employment contexts and made clear that worker protections will not derive
from the judiciary.
The modern expansion of mandatory arbitration into employment
contexts results largely from the Court’s ongoing interpretation of two
sections of the FAA: § 1, which grants a unique employment exception to
application of the FAA, and § 2, which is known as the “saving clause” and
generally makes mandatory arbitration enforceable under the FAA outside
of certain contract defenses.99 The Court has taken an expansive view of § 2,
broadly enforcing arbitration in the employment context, and a limited view
of § 1, finding few employment-based exceptions.100 Thus, this combination
has calcified the use of mandatory arbitration in employment contexts even
in the most unfair cases.

96

See supra Section II.A; Gupta & Khan, supra note 9, at 505.
See supra Part I.
98
Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., No. 21-328, 2022 WL 1611788, at *3–4 (U.S. May 23, 2022).
99
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (1925).
100
See Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 124 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
Court’s parsimonious construction of § 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or Act) is not consistent
with its expansive reading of § 2.”).
97
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Mandatory arbitration first burrowed its way into employment contexts
in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, when the Court adopted a new, broad
interpretation of § 1 of the FAA.101 Section 1 states that the FAA does not
apply “to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”102 The
phrase “any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce” may have reasonably been interpreted to exempt all interstate
employment contracts.103 However, applying the ejusdem generis104 canon in
Circuit City,105 the Court instead held that the residual exclusion of “any
other class of workers” in “Section 1 exempts from the FAA only contracts
of employment of transportation workers.” 106 In so holding, the Court
eliminated the first barrier preventing application of mandatory arbitration to
nonunionized private sector workers, and mandatory arbitration in
employment contexts became generally binding.
A decade later in Concepcion, the Court began to breach the second
floodwall protecting workers by interpreting § 2 of the FAA narrowly.107
Section 2 of the FAA states that arbitration agreements “shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.” 108 Such grounds include
“generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability.”109 California law had forbidden class action waivers in
any contract, deeming such waivers unconscionable. 110 The plaintiffs in
Concepcion had signed a mandatory arbitration agreement that disallowed
claims brought “as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or
representative proceeding.” 111 Thus, under California law, the arbitration
101

Id. at 120–21 (majority opinion).
9 U.S.C. § 1.
103
See Cir. City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 138–39 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that proper
interpretation of § 1 of the FAA should consider that “Congress took care to bar application of the Act to
the class of employment contracts it most obviously had authority to legislate about in 1925,” and that
contemporaneous figures such as then-Secretary Hoover had made clear that “the exemption language
would respond to any ‘objection . . . to the inclusion of workers’ contracts’”).
104
Ejusdem Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). (“[W]hen a general word or
phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of
the same class as those listed.”).
105
532 U.S. at 114–15.
106
Id. at 118–19.
107
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011).
108
9 U.S.C. § 2.
109
Dr.’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
110
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 357–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“California law sets forth certain
circumstances in which ‘class action waivers’ in any contract are unenforceable. In my view, this rule of
state law is consistent with the federal Act’s language and primary objective.”).
111
Id. at 336 (majority opinion).
102
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agreement included unconscionable terms—which are ordinarily
unenforceable under the FAA. 112 However, other Court precedent barred
courts from “invalidat[ing] arbitration agreements under state laws
applicable only to arbitration provisions.”113 Leaning on this exception, the
Supreme Court in Concepcion held that because the state law’s prohibition
on all class action waivers would fall mostly on arbitral proceedings, the
state law impermissibly interfered with the FAA and thus was preempted by
the FAA.114 State unconscionability defenses involving class action waivers
were suddenly no longer a basis for revoking an arbitration agreement.
While Concepcion involved a consumer arbitration agreement and state
law interactions, the Court extended the Concepcion reasoning to
employment contexts involving potential federal law conflicts in the
landmark 2018 case Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis.115 Despite federal statutory
language that implied a right to class action lawsuits,116 the Court in Epic
Systems held that without unambiguous federal statutory language, class
action waivers in employment contracts do not make arbitration agreements
unenforceable.117 Thus, employers may now evade class action lawsuits from
employees entirely through arbitration.
The Court’s expansion of class action waivers to employment contexts
in Epic Systems is best considered in tandem with its earlier decision in
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant. In American Express
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the Court held that class action waivers in
mandatory arbitration agreements were permissible even when the waiver
denied an individual any real opportunity to bring a claim.118 The plaintiffs
had submitted a declaration from an expert economist, which showed that
proving the underlying antitrust claim would cost several hundred thousand
112
Compare 9 U.S.C. § 2 (indicating that arbitration clauses are deemed to be “valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable” unless there exists grounds “at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”), with
Rent-A-Ctr., West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010) (“Like other contracts, however, they may be
invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.’”
(quoting Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687)).
113
Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687.
114
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352 (reversing the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and holding that a ban
on all class action waivers would impermissibly interfere with the Federal Arbitration Act’s elevation of
arbitration).
115
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,138 S. Ct. 1612, 1627 (2018).
116
See id. at 1640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (admonishing the Court for its failure to consider “the
reality that sparked the NLRA’s passage,” which was namely that “employees ordinarily are no match
for the enterprise that hires them” and that the NLRA thus protects “employees’ right to act in concert for
their ‘mutual aid or protection’” (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 158)).
117
Id. at 1631–32 (majority opinion).
118
570 U.S. 228, 231–32, 236–38 (2013) (holding that the class action waiver in the arbitration
agreement prevented collectivized claims despite the paltry value of any such claim without a potential
class action remedy).
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dollars at minimum, even though the maximum recovery available to an
individual was $38,549 when trebled.119 Thus, even facially unconscionable
uses of mandatory arbitration are permissible under this line of precedent.
In conclusion, the Court’s decisions show that it will generally enforce
mandatory arbitration even in situations where plaintiffs have no way to
effectively vindicate their rights. By broadly interpreting the enforceability
of arbitration under § 2 of the FAA and severely limiting the employment
exemptions provided under § 1 of the FAA, the Court has solidified judicial
enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts,
regardless of how coercive those contracts are. While § 2 still provides
opportunities to invalidate unfair mandatory arbitration clauses through
standard contract defenses, it seems that few, if any, defenses will be deemed
acceptable by the Court in practice.120 Further, recent changes in the Court’s
composition will likely reinforce these trends.121 Thus, workers looking for
relief from unfair mandatory arbitration clauses will need to pursue reform
outside of the courts.
IV.

REFORMING THE FAA

The broadly proarbitration posture of the Supreme Court does not
eliminate the possibility of employee-friendly changes to arbitration.
Because the FAA is merely federal statutory law,122 Congress may alter the
language of the FAA to eliminate abusive uses of mandatory arbitration. Due
to recent changes in American leadership 123 and changes in people’s
perceptions of arbitration,124 legislation is a newly viable route to broadly
119

Id. at 231.
See Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1619; Am. Express Co., 570 U.S. at 233; AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011); Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 110 (2001).
121
Justice Amy Coney Barrett, appointed to the Court in 2020, has written opinions previously
indicating she approves of a broad interpretation of the FAA. See Wallace v. Grubhub Holdings, Inc.,
970 F.3d 798, 802–03 (7th Cir. 2020) (declining to extend the FAA’s saving’s clause to Grubhub food
delivery drivers); Weil v. Metal Techs. Inc., 925 F.3d 352, 357–58 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding against
employees on several wage and hour points).
122
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, 201–08, 301–07.
123
See Roberta Rampton, Inauguration Day, from Home: Biden Team Plans Celebration amid
COVID-19, NPR (Dec. 15, 2020, 11:51 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/biden-transition-updates/
2020/12/15/946721063/inauguration-day-from-home-biden-team-plans-celebration-amid-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/2ZGK-J27N] (discussing inaugural planning for a new administration during the
COVID-19 pandemic). This new administration may be especially open to changes to arbitration. See
Paige Smith, Federal Contractors Wary of Push for Biden Ban on Arbitration, BLOOMBERG L. (June 23,
2021, 11:02 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/federal-contractors-wary-of-pushfor-biden-ban-on-arbitration [https://perma.cc/64LB-Y994] (noting that President Biden is being asked
to ban mandatory arbitration clauses by executive order).
124
See McGregor, supra note 1 (pressure at Google and Facebook may be indicative of a broader
pushback against mandatory arbitration clauses amongst white collar workers in America).
120
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reforming mandatory workplace arbitration. This Part explores potential and
developing legislative and professional changes to arbitration in employment
contexts and offers a solution to help protect American workers from its
coercive uses.
Support for arbitration reform is rising,125 but what should arbitration
reform look like? So far, several different reform models have been
considered and a law limiting applications of mandatory arbitration has been
passed. 126 These proposals show promise, but a flexible model of
employment arbitration that provides holistic benefits to workers has yet to
be proffered.
The bubbling up of potential arbitration reform proposals for workers
has spanned more than a decade. In 2009, Senator Russ Feingold proposed
the Arbitration Fairness Act, which would have eliminated arbitration in all
employment and consumer contexts and in any situation involving civil
rights issues.127 Eight years later, Senators Kirsten Gillibrand and Lindsey
Graham offered the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of
2017, making mandatory arbitration unenforceable if it requires arbitration
of a sex discrimination dispute. 128 Cheri Bustos’s H.R. 4445 bill, Ending
Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021,
which became law in March 2022, is the clear progeny of the Gillibrand–
Graham proposal.129 A major but incomplete step towards fully reforming
workplace arbitration contexts, the new law invalidates predispute
mandatory arbitration agreements when applied to sexual assault and sexual
harassment cases. 130 Outside of Congress, alternative reform ideas have
included banning mandatory arbitration in any context in which unequal
bargaining power between parties exists131 and the creation of a government
125
Alexia Fernández Campbell, Democrats Want to Ban Mandatory Arbitration at Work. Senate
Republicans are Listening, VOX (April 3, 2019, 5:00 PM) https://www.vox.com/2019/4/3/18292168/
forced-arbitration-senate-bill-hearing [https://perma.cc/A6M9-7GCC] (discussing the bipartisan shifts
towards reforming arbitration: “To understand how significant it is that Senate Republicans held a hearing
on mandatory arbitration, all you really need to know is this: The last time the Senate Judiciary Committee
discussed the legislation to regulate arbitration was in 2013, when Democrats controlled the Senate.”).
126
Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021, 9 U.S.C
§§ 401–02 (2022).
127
Farmer, supra note 61, at 2361 (“Many have argued that mandatory arbitration should be
eliminated entirely in cases where the parties have unequal bargaining power. Most prominently, former
Senator Russ Feingold put forth the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, which declares that ‘no predispute
arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment, consumer,
franchise, or civil rights dispute.’” (footnotes omitted)).
128
Sternlight, supra note 23, at 206.
129
See 9 U.S.C §§ 401–02.
130
Id. at § 402.
131
See Farmer, supra note 61, at 2363 (considering the efficacy of banning mandatory arbitration in
cases of unequal bargaining power and declining to endorse it).
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middleman to police arbitration providers. 132 Disclosure changes, such as
requiring tracking of which employers arbitrators have worked for and
corresponding arbitration outcomes, as well as ethical advances, have also
gained attention.133
The most effective solution would likely blend some of these ideas
while also considering the positive role fair arbitrations could play in the
employment context. After all, arbitration reduces congestion in the court
system, provides increased flexibility to parties, and allows for more efficient
dispute resolution. 134 By changing the timing of arbitration agreements,
removing class action bans, and developing a new ethical regime for
arbitrators, these benefits can flow to workers in fairly structured arbitral
proceedings.
First, federal statutes should specify that arbitration be offered to
employees as an alternative to litigation only at the time a dispute arises and
that arbitration agreements should be truly negotiated. Most employees
bound to mandatory arbitration agreements signed their agreements when
newly hired and did not negotiate terms.135 Because new employees may
underestimate the risks of future disputes and prioritize impressing their new
employers, this is a particularly poor time to offer mandatory arbitration
agreements. By forcing employers to wait to offer arbitration until a dispute
arises and circumscribing that agreement to only the dispute at hand, it may
be possible to create a mutually beneficial system of arbitration for the
employment context. Such a system would create natural competition
between arbitration and litigation, potentially improving each and would
likely reduce the effects of the repeat-player bias currently found in
employment arbitration as arbitrators would suddenly need to win over the
trust of employees too.
Some may worry that providing a choice between arbitration and
traditional litigation would reduce the inherent benefits of arbitration. 136
Others may think this proposal does not go far enough.137 However, because
arbitration’s beneficial aspects do not currently flow to employees, a less
132

Id. at 2364–65 (considering the effectiveness of adding a central regulator).
Id. at 2366–67, 2372–73 (considering how arbitrators could be subject to new ethical requirements
in order to rein in abusive uses of arbitration in contracts of unequal bargaining power).
134
Commander, supra note 24, at 33–34.
135
See Colvin, supra note 5, at 8–9.
136
See Farmer, supra note 61, at 2362 (“[I]f litigation costs were higher than arbitration costs, then
a claimant likely to prevail in a case where winning parties may recover attorney’s fees could refuse
arbitration and compel a large settlement by threatening his opponent with costly litigation.”).
137
See id. at 2361 (“Some criticize the Arbitration Fairness Act for not going far enough, arguing
that it still allows companies to take advantage of consumers, including by tricking them into arbitration
when it is not actually favorable to them.” (footnote omitted)).
133
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efficient arbitration system would still be preferable to the existing structure.
On the other hand, proposals such as Senator Feingold’s,138 which seek to
eliminate arbitration wholesale, are likely misguided: many employee cases
may be low value.139 Employees with low-value cases would likely prefer to
avoid the drawn-out, costly system of litigation. Real choice, which the Court
has emphasized in its proarbitration decisions, 140 should be offered to
employees.
Second, arbitration clauses that eliminate the opportunity to form class
action lawsuits must be classified as inherently unconscionable and thus
unenforceable.141 Commercial entities must not be allowed to evade entire
areas of law through dispute resolution trickery.142 Because it is clear that the
Court will deem virtually no mandatory arbitration clause eliminating a class
action remedy unconscionable, Congress must respond boldly, enacting
unambiguous statutory language that explicitly prohibits such clauses as ipso
facto unconscionable. Eliminating class action bans and delaying the signing
of arbitration agreements may remedy the weaknesses of arbitration in
employment discrimination cases.
In this vein, Cheri Bustos’s Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual
Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021143 and its forebearer, Senator
Kirsten Gillibrand’s Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of
2017,144 each represent bold—albeit underinclusive—visions for arbitration
reform. The recently passed law laudably allows victims of sexual assault
and harassment to choose arbitration or formal litigation after the arising of
a dispute. 145 Some victims of workplace sexual harassment may crucially

138

Id.
See Colvin, supra note 70, at 6 (“This employee win rate [in arbitration cases] is . . . lower than
employee win rates in litigation. However, it should be noted that we may be comparing apples and
oranges here in that the characteristics of cases in arbitration may differ systematically from those in
litigation. For example, it could be that arbitration contains more low-value cases than litigation.”
(emphasis added)).
140
See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018) (“Should employees and
employers be allowed to agree that any disputes between them will be resolved through one-on-one
arbitration?”).
141
Such legislation should, for instance, articulate that arbitration agreements do not in any way limit
the availability of class action lawsuits.
142
See Sternlight, supra note 23, at 177 (arguing that mandatory arbitration can allow employers to
“use arbitration clauses to insulate themselves from liability under federal and state employment laws”).
143
Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021, 9 U.S.C
§§ 401–02 (2022).
144
Sternlight, supra note 23, at 206.
145
See 9 U.S.C § 402.
139
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prefer the confidential forum of an arbitral proceeding,146 so outright banning
workplace arbitration may harm these victims. However, the law exclusively
covers disputes involving sex discrimination, whereas evidence suggests that
arbitration in its current form is ineffective for a wide range of employment
discrimination cases. 147 By responding to arbitration’s ineffectiveness in
employment discrimination cases with a one-off legislative fix, Congress
may be positioning itself for an undesirable whack-a-mole cycle of
legislating, forcing itself to counter discriminatory uses of ill-suited arbitral
proceedings one-by-one as they arise. Broadly available, delayed choice
mixed with the availability of class action remedies would likely obviate the
need for one-off legislative fixes to discriminatory applications of
arbitration.
Third, arbitrators need greater oversight and enforced ethical standards.
While rules exist that require arbitrators to engage in neutral decisionmaking and avoid conflicts of interest, these rules are often voluntary.148
High ethical standards for arbitrators must be mandatory and enforced.
Almost all other arbitration reforms will require unambiguous federal
legislation due to the ever-increasing proarbitration stance of the Supreme
Court, 149 but states can enforce ethical standards without federal
involvement. States should mandate registration of arbitrators and require
adherence to codes of professional conduct for arbitrators. Ethical standards,
after all, do not ban arbitration but rather improve it. 150 To facilitate the
implementation of these standards, states may choose to adopt data
disclosure systems and to develop regulatory bodies to track the incoming
data and ensure ethical compliance.151
146
See David L. Ryan, With Confidentiality Rule, Mass. Lawmakers Have Sexual Harassment
Victims’ Concerns in Mind, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 9, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/
opinion/letters/2019/02/09/upholding-confidentiality-rule-mass-lawmakers-have-sexual-harassmentvictims-concerns-mind/b4BwMOMcUWXRW6zCgXpwtN/story.html[https://perma.cc/BH3J-S2TX]
(discussing some victims’ desire to have access to confidential forums through the use of NDAs).
147
See Sternlight, supra note 23, at 178–80 (exploring the discriminatory impact of arbitration on
vulnerable employee-plaintiffs).
148
Farmer, supra note 61, at 2372.
149
See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1626–27 (2018) (“Congress ‘does not alter the
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might
say, hide elephants in mouseholes.’” (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 468
(2001)).
150
Farmer, supra note 61, at 2372–74.
151
Data disclosure systems can allow for state aggregation of arbitrators’ performance to detect
biased arbitrators quickly. See Farmer, supra note 61, at 2364–66 (discussing potential regulatory bodies
for overseeing arbitrations and how one potential data disclosure regime may be administered such that
arbitrators would be dissuaded from exhibiting pro-employer biases). While the AAA and JAMS
currently provide some ethical guidelines for arbitrators, anecdotal reports of unethical arbitrators indicate
that they are likely insufficiently policing arbitrators’ conduct. See Estlund, supra note 66, at 686.
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By delaying the signing of arbitration agreements in employment
contexts, preserving class action lawsuits, and enforcing new ethical
standards for arbitrators, it is possible to envision a system of arbitration that
can work for workers. For most of those improvements to take root, though,
Congress needs to legislate.
CONCLUSION
Arbitration’s uses have expanded dramatically over the past forty years.
No longer do arbitrators solely review commercial contract issues between
parties of relatively equal bargaining power. 152 Arbitration’s applications
now include employment, labor, and consumer disputes, each of which
regularly appear before arbitral tribunals.153 The drafters of the FAA likely
never anticipated that arbitration would yield such extensive outgrowths.154
Developments in the uses of arbitration necessitate developments in the
practice of arbitration. In employment contexts, the current model of
arbitration harms workers without providing similar benefits to those
provided to parties in business-to-business transactions. 155 Therefore,
protecting American workers requires reform. Congressional action remains
the best route for achieving equitable arbitration reform. By both delaying
when employees sign arbitration agreements and providing employees with
a real choice between arbitration and litigation, legislators can ensure that
employee arbitration clauses are properly negotiated and fair. By eliminating
the use of arbitration to silence class action lawsuits, legislators can prevent
employers from choosing which laws they intend to follow. Finally, by
strengthening and enforcing ethical standards for arbitrators, state and
federal legislators can prevent avoidable abuses of arbitral powers. As
Justice Gorsuch pointed out in Epic Systems, “it’s the job of Congress by
legislation . . . both to write the laws and to repeal them.”156
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